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Abstract 
This paper examines the growth experience of Indonesia in the years before and 
after the Asian financial crisis. Particular attention is paid to the relationship 
between economic growth and petroleum sector‟s total factor productivity 
(TFP). It finds the possibility that post-crisis Indonesian economic growth has 
„recoupled‟ with petroleum sector‟s TFP – fluctuations in petroleum TFP is 
directly correlated with fluctuations in economic growth. Further, although 
keeping Indonesia‟s petroleum sector open to fair competition should be the 
prime policy, the fact regarding resource nationalism might need to be taken 
into account in designing the policy to develop the productivity of Indonesia‟s 
petroleum sector.  
Abstrak 
Makalah ini membahas pengalaman pertumbuhan Indonesia pada tahun-tahun 
sebelum dan setelah krisis keuangan Asia. Perhatian khusus diberikan untuk 
hubungan antara pertumbuhan ekonomi dan total factor productivy (TFP) sek-
tor minyak bumi. Hasil penelitian ini mengungkapkan bahwa pasca krisis keua-
ngan pertumbuhan ekonomi Indonesia adalah 'ditambah' dengan TFP sektor 
minyak bumi. Fluktuasi TFP minyak bumi berhubungan langsung dengan fluk-
tuasi pertumbuhan ekonomi. Selanjutnya, meskipun kebijakan menjaga sektor 
minyak bumi Indonesia ini terbuka untuk persaingan yang sehat tetap harus 
dijadikan kebijakan utama, nasionalisme sumber daya mungkin perlu diperhi-
tungkan dalam merancang kebijakan untuk mengembangkan produktivitas sek-
tor minyak bumi di Indonesia. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the growth experience 
of Indonesia in the years before and after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. In par-
ticular, it examines how pre-crisis Indonesia 
was able to release its heavy dependence on 
petroleum sector and how post-crisis Indo-
nesia once again relies on its petroleum sec-
tor amid continuously declining production. 
A review of literature discussed below 
shows that this study is the first to apply 
growth accounting exercise to Indonesia‟s 
petroleum sector and examines the relation 
between the sector‟s total factor productivity 
(TFP) and Indonesia economic growth. 
The period 1991-2010 is selected as 
the scope of study because these are two of 
the most dynamic, turbulent decades in the 
history of Indonesia. There were events 
which had profound impacts on the eco-
nomic development of the country. The 
years 1991-1997 were the end years of the 
Soeharto regime, where efforts to release 
the country from its dependency on petro-
leum were in full swing. The years 1998-
2003 were marked by severe economic, 
social and political crises in Indonesia 
which culminated in the fall of Soeharto 
(after ruling the country for over 30 years) 
and this event was followed by a period of 
instability. The years 2004-2010 was a pe-
riod of political stability amid economic 
problems which still have to be faced by 
the country. The year 2004 witnessed the 
change of status of the country from a net 
oil exporter into a net oil importer. Further, 
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the global financial crisis of 2008 adversely 
affected the country‟s economic growth 
although its impact was less severe than the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. 
Review of literature shows that 
there are many studies that have applied the 
neoclassical model to determine the sources 
of economic growth of nations, however, 
the larger proportion of them take an ag-
gregate level or national level point of view 
rather than focus on a specific economic 
sector or an industry level point of view. 
For example, using cross-country national 
level data Young) employed the neoclas-
sical model to analyze the sources of the 
phenomenal economic growth of the East 
Asian countries. They found that the source 
of high economic growth rates experienced 
by those countries was due to the massive 
growth in capital and labour inputs. Fur-
thermore, Krugman) argued that since the 
source of this growth was not derived from 
TFP, those countries would not be able to 
maintain their high rates of economic 
growth. This is because, in the long-run, 
adding more capital and labour inputs 
would result in a decrease in output per unit 
of input, brought about by the logic of di-
minishing returns (Solow, 1957). 
Other cross-country studies using 
different data, measurement methods and 
time periods have provided various results. 
For example, using data from 145 coun-
tries, Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura) found that 
the contribution of TFP in economic 
growth is much higher in western countries, 
Southern Europe and Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NIC) than in other regions. 
Based on data from 99 nations, Chen and 
Yu) found that the production pattern of the 
majority of these countries showed the abil-
ity to take advantage of technological inno-
vations. A study by Grosskopf and Self) 
concluded that TFP appeared to be the driv-
ing force behind the economic growth of 
Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, 
while the economic growth of Indonesia 
and Malaysia could be explained by the 
accumulation of physical capital. 
Despite the analytical rigor and me-
ticulous attention to detail, there are, how-
ever several limitations that need to be 
raised regarding the cross-country analysis. 
Firstly, by grouping several countries to-
gether, country-specific socio-economic 
differences could lead to conceptual and 
statistical problems (Crafts; Levine & Zer-
vos; Taylor). Secondly, estimating the 
growth rate of several countries altogether 
may not be appropriate due to the broad 
exogenous differences across countries 
such as the differences in human capital, 
government policy and natural resources 
(Quah).  
Due to the inherent limitations of 
cross-country analysis, several empirical 
studies have focused their attention on the 
application of the neoclassical growth 
model within a country-specific context at 
the aggregate level and in the case of Indo-
nesia it can be studied in the works of Alis-
jahbana); Osada); Van der Eng), among 
others. When these types of studies disag-
gregate the national level data into the in-
dustry level, however, more attention is 
usually paid to the Indonesian manufactur-
ing industry rather than the petroleum in-
dustry (see, for example, in Aswicahyono 
and Hill); Ikhsan); Margono and Sharma); 
Suyanto and Salim)). Hence, although con-
siderable research has been devoted to the 
analysis of the sources of growth in the In-
donesian economy, less attention has been 
paid to the petroleum sector. 
Indonesia‟s economic history shows 
that oil shocks of 1970s and early 1980s 
brought a significant change in Indonesia‟s 
petroleum industry and the economy. As 
such, during this period the government 
became increasingly dependent on the pe-
troleum industry for its revenue and as the 
source of foreign exchange earnings 
(Barnes). The proportion of petroleum rev-
enue in total government revenue increased 
significantly during these two oil shocks, 
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from around 26% in 1969 to 55% in 1974 
and reached its peak in 1981 with a share of 
71% of total government revenue 
(Widiyanto). 
These huge windfall profits suc-
cessfully removed the acute balance of 
payments constraint which for three dec-
ades since the country‟s independence had 
limited the ability of the government to im-
plement its economic development pro-
grams (Arndt). Hence, Indonesia‟s eco-
nomic growth showed significant increases 
compared to the previous period. During 
1960-1967 the economy grew at an average 
rate of only 1.7% annually. Following the 
windfall profit from oil revenue, economic 
growth increased significantly and reached 
an annual average of 7.9% during 1967-
1973 and 7.5% during 1973-1981 (Booth).  
Overall, the years from 1968 to 1981 
had witnessed some remarkable economic 
achievements in Indonesia where the aver-
age annual gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate accelerated to over 7% per year. 
Compared to the economic achievements 
during the first two decades after indepen-
dence, this was indeed an impressive record. 
According to Booth), this rapid growth can 
be closely associated with the sustained im-
provement in the country‟s terms of trade 
that mostly accrued from oil revenue. 
The periods of oil boom for Indone-
sia eventually ended after 1981. The share 
of petroleum in the government‟s total fis-
cal revenue declined after 1982. From 1980 
until 1984 petroleum revenue still ac-
counted for over 65% of the total revenue. 
However, by 1992 the petroleum industry 
contributed no more than 30% of total gov-
ernment revenue (Widiyanto). This long-
term decline might closely be associated 
with, first, the decline in the world‟s oil 
prices and, second, the depletion of Indone-
sia‟s proven oil reserves. 
After the steep increase in oil prices 
due to the two oil shocks in the 1970s the 
price of oil reached its peak in 1980 at 
US$35.48 per barrel and since then, at least 
until 1999, oil prices declined. Further, Indo-
nesia‟s proven oil reserves looked bleak. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the conditions of the proven 
oil reserves in Indonesia from 1980 to 2010.  
As seen in Figure 1, Indonesia‟s 
proven oil reserves have shown a steadily 
declining trend since 1980. Even though it 
peaked briefly in 1991 with 11 billion bar-
rels of proven reserves, it has been consis-
tently falling and stayed at approximately 4 
billion barrels from 2004 to 2010. This 
depletion in oil reserves was consequently 
followed by the reduction in the production 
of crude oil and eventually caused the oil 
revenue to also decline.  
 
 
Source: The Titi Tudorancea Bulletin) 
Figure 1: Indonesia‟s proven oil reserves, 1980-2010 
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Source: World Bank) 
Figure 2: Indonesia‟s GDP growth, 1981-2012 
 
 
Source: The Titi Tudorancea Bulletin) 
Figure 3: Oil production and consumption, 1980-2009 
 
After the end of the oil boom era, 
Indonesia‟s economic growth during the 
early part of 1980s declined significantly, 
as shown in figure 3. 
It can be seen in figure 3 that during 
1980-1982 Indonesia‟s economic growth 
rate steadily declined from 8.7% in 1980 to 
8.1% in 1981 and declined steeply in 1982 
with an economic growth rate of only 
1.1%. Although there was a brief increase 
in 1983 with a growth of 8.4%, economic 
growth declined significantly in 1985 with 
a rate of only 3.5%. 
Due to the end of the oil boom era 
and the consequent decline in economic 
growth, the Indonesian government applied 
an „exit strategy‟ of diversifying the econ-
omy away from its heavy dependence on 
oil resources. This strategy had, more or 
less, successfully prevented Indonesia from 
catching the Dutch disease (Usui). Indone-
sian economic ministers at that time recog-
nised the limitations of the government as 
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the only single engine of prosperity and 
thus promoted market-based production 
structures as new engines of economic 
growth (Arndt; Prawiro). The consequence 
of this policy was the deregulation of many 
sectors of the economy to enable private 
investment to thrive. This deregulation af-
fected, among others, the financial, manu-
facturing and trade sectors (Booth). 
All measures taken under the exit 
strategy appeared to work. The growth 
rates of GDP from the mid-1980s to the 
mid-1990s were similar to, and at times 
were slightly above, the oil boom era (Fig-
ure 2). This was achieved even though pe-
troleum only contributed an average of 
44% to total government revenue during 
1985-1990 and only an average of 27% 
during 1991-1996. So confident was the 
government of the successes of its exit 
strategy that in 1994, President Soeharto 
addressed the OPEC delegation in Bali stat-
ing that oil “no longer plays an important 
role” in the Indonesian economy (Barnes). 
However, deregulation, especially 
the deregulation of the financial sector
1
, 
was believed to be one of the factors that 
led the economy into the 1997/1998 finan-
cial crisis (Bennett; Kaminsky & Reinhart). 
An overly liberalised banking system 
coupled with a weak financial structure had 
led to a procreation of precariously under-
capitalised and poorly supervised banks. 
These conditions, in turn, prompted large 
private external debts (most of which was 
unhedged and short-term) and a rapid 
build-up of volatile private capital inflows 
(Djiwandono; Hill; Thee). All of these wor-
sened the burden of the crisis for the coun-
try. Indonesia was the worst affected by the 
Asian financial crisis compared with other 
East Asian countries such as Malaysia, 
Thailand or South Korea (Hill, 2000). So 
                                                          
1
 In October 1988 the central bank of Indonesia 
(Bank Indonesia) launched a deregulation package 
known as PAKTO 88 that relaxed significantly the 
establishment of private and foreign-owned banks in 
Indonesia see Bennett); (Prawiro). 
severe was the crisis in Indonesia that its 
economic growth rate fell by a dramatic 
amount in just one year, from an average of 
over 7% annually during 1990 to 1997 to 
almost -14% in 1998 (Figure 2). 
After the fall of Soeharto (dubbed 
„era reformasi‟2 or the reformation era), the 
petroleum industry struggled to regain its 
production capabilities back to the same 
level as before. During this time period 
domestic oil production steadily decreased 
whereas domestic consumption of petro-
leum products was increasing (Figure 3). 
This mismatch between the supply 
of oil and demand for oil, as shown Figure 
3, impacted on the position of Indonesia as 
one of the world‟s oil producers. In 2004, 
for the first time since oil was found in the 
Netherlands East Indies era, Indonesia be-
came a net oil importer. Eventually, in Sep-
tember 2008, OPEC announced that Indo-
nesia – which had been a member since 
1962 – had formally suspended its mem-
bership in the organization (Pallone). 
In 2010, Indonesia‟s proven oil re-
serves amounted to 3.99 billion barrels. 
With the 2010 level of exploitation of 
around 300 million barrels a year and with-
out significant new investment in explora-
tion and advanced exploitation technolo-
gies the available reserves may be com-
pletely dry by the mid-2020s (OECD/IEA).  
The era reformasi was also marked 
by two dramatic events relating to the pe-
troleum industry. The first event was the 
enactment of Law No.22/2001 which had 
the main aim of attracting new investment 
to Indonesia‟s ailing petroleum industry 
and the second event was the annulling of 
some of the significant provisions of this 
law in 2012. 
                                                          
2
 This is the name Indonesians give for the time 
period since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The name 
signifies the effort to reform the country‟s social, 
political and economic structures from the legacy of 
Soeharto administration which was generally cha-
racterised by corruption, collusion and nepotism 
(Anwar, 2004) 
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Recognizing the continuing decline 
in oil production, the Indonesian govern-
ment with the approval of the parliament 
passed the Petroleum Law No. 22/2001 
which had the main purpose of attracting 
new investment, either from domestic 
sources or foreign sources, in the upstream 
petroleum industry, with the hope of in-
creasing the industry‟s level of production. 
Under the new law, the regulatory func-
tions in upstream and downstream activities 
were transferred from the state oil compa-
ny, Pertamina, to new institutions called 
BPMIGAS (Executive Agency for Up-
stream Petroleum Activity) and BPHMI-
GAS (Executive Agency for Downstream 
Petroleum Activity) (OECD/IEA).  
This new law replaced the Pertami-
na Law No.8/1971 and thus practically 
ended the monopoly power of Pertamina, 
as the company had to surrender its posi-
tion as licensor, supervisor and regulator in 
the Indonesian petroleum industry, render-
ing it only like a common petroleum com-
pany (Karim). The pro free-market nature 
of the new law was formulated with the 
hope of increasing competition and the 
economic efficiency of the petroleum in-
dustry and eventually be able to boost the 
country‟s petroleum output. 
In 2012 a petition was submitted by a 
number of prominent figures and organiza-
tions against the Law No.22/2001, as they 
saw this law as too liberal, violating the state 
sovereignty in the energy sector. The Consti-
tutional Court, having considered Article 33 
Section 3 of the Constitution, which states: 
„The land and the waters and the natural rich-
es contained therein shall be controlled by the 
State and shall be used for the greatest benefit 
of the people‟, hinged its decision on its in-
terpretation of „shall be controlled by the 
State‟ and ruled that BPMIGAS was uncons-
titutional and thus must cease to exist 
(Cornwell & Anas; Karim).  
To avoid turmoil and legal uncer-
tainty in the Indonesian petroleum industry 
following the liquidation of BPMIGAS, the 
President issued decree No. 95/2012 which 
transferred the duties, functions, and organ-
izations of BPMIGAS to SKKMIGAS 
(Special Task Force for Upstream Petro-
leum Activities) – which is a unit under the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 
Furthermore, the government announced 
that all contracts including Production 
Sharing Contract or Contract of Work that 
were signed between all parties and 
BPMIGAS before the annulment would 
remain valid (Azwar; Wardany). According 
to the presidential decree, SKKMIGAS was 
not intended to be a permanent body 
(Karim), however, three years later the 
government has not yet worked out its re-
placement. 
This event made foreign investors 
nervous (The Economist). Even though the 
government gave assurances that all current 
contracts would be honoured, international 
oil giants who have operations in Indone-
sia, such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and 
CNOOC, are now wondering what will 
happen when they come up for contract re-
newals. Indeed a study by Boyd, Devero, 
Frias, Meyer, and Ross) which was con-
ducted in 2009, three years before the 
BPMIGAS debacle, concluded from sever-
al interviews with petroleum company ex-
ecutives in Indonesia that impetuous legis-
lative decisions and frequent regulatory 
changes have deteriorated the legal certain-
ty climate for investors and thus have ad-
versely impacted their business sentiment. 
According to some interviewees in the 
study, ambiguous legislation and abrupt 
changes in laws and regulations as well as 
the nonexistence of reliable channels to set-
tle business disputes have damaged inves-
tor confidence and subsequently deterred 
them from funding new exploration 
projects. It is not hard to see that these con-
ditions may have thwarted the petroleum 
industry‟s expansion and thus negatively 
affected output production. 
The petition against Petroleum Law 
No. 22/2001 reflected the rise of resource 
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nationalism in Indonesia, particularly since 
the era reformasi began (Habir; Soesastro). 
Some studies suggested that resource na-
tionalism is a cyclical phenomenon where 
many factors might become involved in its 
rise and fall (Bremmer & Johnston; Vivo-
da). The high price of oil since the 2000s 
was considered to be the main reason for 
the resurgence of resource nationalism in 
many resource rich countries (Vivoda, 
2009). Related to this, in Indonesia this 
sentiment became stronger when the gov-
ernment began to reduce its fuel subsidy 
due to budgetary pressures following inter-
national oil price increases.  
 
Method 
It is considered that the production struc-
ture of the petroleum sector can be 
represented by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
(1−𝛼)
 
where 𝑌𝑡  is output, 𝐾𝑡  is physical capital, 𝐿𝑡  
is labour and 𝐴𝑡  is TFP. 
 Since there is no official estimate 
on capital stock, the capital stock series is 
constructed from investment expenditure in 
the upstream petroleum industry. Following 
(Taylor), capital stock series is constructed 
by summing capital stock from all existing 
asset vintages using the following formula:  
 𝐼𝑖 − 
𝑡
𝑖=1
𝛿𝑖 𝑃𝑖  
Here, I represents gross investment in the 
petroleum sector, t denotes the age of the 
oldest vintage of capital stock in the petro-
leum sector, i=1 denotes the current capital 
stock in the petroleum sector, δ is the de-
preciation
3
, and P is the price level. 
 Following Van der Eng), the main 
data source that is used to estimate the val-
                                                          
3
 The rate of depreciation used in this study is the 
same as the implicit rate of depreciation used by BPS 
in its System of National Accounts, which is 5%. 
ue of α for the Indonesian economy is the 
BPS‟ Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi (so-
cial accounting matrix or SAM) (Badan 
Pusat Statistik). However, BPS does not 
publish SAM yearly and during the period 
of 1991-2010 SAM was published in only 
particular years. Hence, these data will be 
used as the base to estimate capital‟s share 
of output for the whole period under study. 
The calculations are shown in Table 1 and 
α is found to be 0.56. 
Past studies reveal that the value of 
α applied to Indonesia ranged from 0.36 to 
0.69; further, the value of α used for differ-
ent countries in East Asia ranged from 0.49 
to 0.75 (Alisjahbana; Lau & Park; Van der 
Eng). Thus, it appears that the α value of 
0.56 for Indonesia is consistent with prior 
estimations. 
Table 2 presents the results of the 
growth accounting exercise for the petro-
leum sector in Indonesia for the period 
1991-2010.  
 
Results Discussion 
As seen in Table 2, during 1991-1997, pe-
troleum output growth was mostly the re-
sult of capital stock accumulation. This 
dominant contribution of capital stock is 
consistent with the generally conducive in-
vestment climate in the petroleum sector 
during the period.  
During the period of transition and 
adjustment of 1998-2003, the contribution 
of both capital accumulation and TFP de-
clined and the growth of petroleum output 
was mostly due to the expansion in labour 
input. This relatively high contribution of 
labour input as compared to other factor in-
puts appears to be consistent with govern-
ment policy in encouraging the development 
of human resources through the expansion 
of petroleum education and the opening of 
many training facilities which were started 
during the second five-year plan or REPE-
LITA II in the 1970s (Indonesian Govern-
ment, 1974). 
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Table 1: Capital‟s share of output (2005=100) 
SAM Year 
Output 
(million US$) 
Capital Income 
(million US$) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙′𝑠 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡= 
(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)/𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 
1993 588.959,63 321.322,62 0,55 
1995 697.587,30 396.693,56 0,57 
1998 179.595,76 136.548,25 0,76 
1999 219.184,28 102.482,79 0,47 
2000 224.260,44 142.343,53 0,63 
2003 264.926,46 117.308,56 0,44 
2005 270.627,21 138.741,92 0,51 
2008 367.686,30 192.859,20 0,52 
AVERAGE 0,56 
Sources: Badan Pusat Statistik); author‟s calculations. 
 
Table 2: Indonesian petroleum sector‟s growth accounting (average annual changes, %) 
Period Change in Ouput 
Due to Capital 
Stock 
Due to Labour 
Input 
Due to TFP 
1991-1997 -0,92 -0,12 -0,41 -0,39 
1998-2003 -1,60 -0,77 0,14 -0,97 
2004-2010 0,77 0,11 0,08 0,58 
Source: author‟s calculations 
 
The period from 2004 to 2010 wit-
nessed a surge in the contribution of TFP to 
petroleum output. This significant progress 
in the contribution of TFP may be unex-
pected since it occurred during a time full 
of unfavourable conditions that normally 
make productivity improvements in this 
sector very challenging. First, particularly 
since 1998, there was no coherent and 
comprehensive government policy on the 
medium-to-long-term development of the 
country‟s petroleum sector. The main focus 
of the central government at this time was 
to deal with social unrest and separatism 
that overwhelmed the country following the 
Asian financial crisis and the resignation of 
Soeharto. Nevertheless, to claim that during 
this time period there was no government 
supervision of the industry at all would be 
an exaggeration. The Indonesian ministry 
of resources (Kementerian ESDM) and 
BPMIGAS (now SKKMIGAS), as the 
technical arms of the government in the 
upstream petroleum sector, still played a 
key role in the development of this sector, 
particularly in short-term planning and de-
velopment. Nevertheless, at the national 
level there was no comprehensive medium-
to-long-term national strategy that could 
bind all of the nation‟s stakeholders to-
wards a common goal of achieving the op-
timum benefit from the country‟s endow-
ment in petroleum resources. 
Second, the period from 1998 to 
2003 was a period of social and political 
abnormality in Indonesia. In the political 
sphere, there were three presidents, each 
with their own cabinets. In the social 
sphere, there were widespread and violent 
social conflicts, imminent terrorism activi-
ties and the increasing secessionist move-
ments in some regions. Even though social 
and political normalization has generally 
been achieved since 2004, some of these 
problems still exist, albeit at a reduced fre-
quency. Moreover, during the 2004-2010 
period, the country continued to have the 
same issues which have dragged the econ-
omy down for decades, such as corruption 
and weak legal systems (Basri). 
Amid these unfavourable circums-
tances, the reform in the petroleum sector 
in the early 2000s appeared to have resulted 
in this acceleration of TFP growth. This 
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significant increase in TFP growth during 
2004-2010 occurred following the imple-
mentation of the petroleum sector‟s deregu-
lation policy which was marked with the 
introduction of Petroleum Law No. 
22/2001 and came into effect on 23 No-
vember 2001. This new law practically 
ended the monopoly power of Pertamina in 
Indonesian petroleum industry. The pro 
free-market nature of this law encouraged 
the petroleum sector to shed some of its 
inefficiencies, as it has been able to stay 
competitive in a new era of market compe-
tition. 
During the Soeharto era, Pertamina 
held monopoly power in all areas of the 
petroleum industry in Indonesia. In the area 
of upstream petroleum, the company served 
as licensor, supervisor, regulator and opera-
tor all at once (Butt & Siregar, 2013; Ka-
rim). Even though over 90% of Indonesia‟s 
petroleum at this time was produced by 
private oil companies (World Bank), under 
the scheme of production sharing contract 
(PSC) and contract of work (CoW) these 
private companies in effect operated under 
the control of Pertamina and were subject 
to its directives. In other words, they were 
no more than just „service providers‟. With 
this background, the productivity of the In-
donesian upstream petroleum sector before 
the enactment of the new law may best be 
represented by the conditions of Pertamina 
itself.  
When Pertamina still held its mo-
nopoly power, aside from its main job in 
managing all aspects of the country‟s petro-
leum industry, the company was also bur-
dened by responsibilities to assist the na-
tional development efforts. One of the 
prominent examples of such a responsibili-
ty was Pertamina‟s financing role in the 
establishment of Krakatau Steel plant, a 
US$5 billion mega project established with 
the purpose of supporting the country‟s in-
dustrialization process – which unfortu-
nately became a misadventure due to gross 
mismanagement (Dowling & Yap).  
Rather than be obligated only by 
specific financial performance or returns on 
investment, Pertamina was also burdened 
by many social obligations such as guaran-
teeing the availability of oil products 
throughout the vast archipelagic country at 
a uniform subsidized price regardless of the 
costs (World Bank). Further, a special audit 
report revealed that embezzlement, illegal 
commissions, mark-ups on procurement 
contracts and sheer inefficiency had cost 
Pertamina around $6.1 billion in lost reve-
nue between 1997 and 1998 alone (OGJ). 
Procurement and resources allocation 
processes in Pertamina were lengthy 
(sometimes over 10 months) and were be-
ing done without adequate demand plan-
ning and forecasting, supply planning or 
good inventory management. Inefficiencies 
that can be attributed to these procurement 
and resources allocation processes alone 
were estimated to reach around US$1 bil-
lion each year (World Bank, 2000). In the 
global upstream industry‟s rank, Pertami-
na‟s financial returns from exploration and 
production activities fell into the bottom 
quartile. The estimated inefficiencies 
stemming from exploration and production 
activities alone reached between US$1.3 
billion to US$2.0 billion (World Bank, 
2000).  
Also, there was a conflict of interest 
arising from the position of Pertamina as an 
operator while at the same time also serv-
ing as a regulator. As an operator, Pertami-
na engages in exploration, development 
and production activities; whereas as a reg-
ulator, it grants new exploration areas to 
private companies. This arrangement may 
allow Pertamina to hold some specific 
fields which hold better prospects but not 
carry out the exploration and development 
activities, while at the same time denying 
access for private companies to the field 
(World Bank). Overall, Pertamina was far 
from implementing sound business practic-
es in all aspects of its operations. With all 
its power and lack of accountability, during 
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these times Indonesians liked to satirise 
Pertamina as „not a company but a country 
within a country‟. These practices eventual-
ly led to inefficiencies in Indonesia‟s petro-
leum sector. 
After the fall of Soeharto and the 
start of the reformation era, the country‟s 
stakeholders intended to tackle these ineffi-
ciencies in Indonesia‟s petroleum sector 
with the enactment of the Petroleum Law 
No. 22/2001. This law was enacted with 
three key components. First, Pertamina no 
longer holds a monopoly over all activities 
in the petroleum sector and the company no 
longer performs the dual functions of regu-
lator and industry participant. Second, the 
country‟s petroleum sector is disaggregated 
into „upstream‟ and „downstream‟, and a 
new regulator has been established for each 
of those sub-sectors. Third, the „authority 
to mine‟ which was previously held by Per-
tamina, is now held by the government 
(Tivey, Habriansyah, & Abrar). The law 
guarantees that Pertamina holds the same 
position as other ordinary petroleum com-
panies. The main objective of this arrange-
ment is that the petroleum sector in Indone-
sia will be subject to competition mechan-
isms that are reasonable, fair and transpa-
rent with appropriate pricing in accordance 
with market forces (Pertamina, 2013). 
A study by Bridgman, Gomes, and 
Teixeira) on the sources of TFP growth in 
Petrobras (Brazil‟s national oil company) 
concluded that even the threat of – despite 
no immediate de facto – privatization and 
market competition is enough to force im-
proved productivity. In the case of Perta-
mina, after losing its monopoly power, the 
company has been forced to operate with 
more focus on performance and efficiency, 
as any other private company should be. 
Thus, for the Indonesian upstream petro-
leum sector, the reform brought a level 
playing field for all players in this sector 
and this put pressure on them to be more 
efficient in order to survive. 
In the more democratic Indonesian 
society after the end of Soeharto era, the 
public demands a more transparent and re-
sponsible public governance. Responding 
to these public pressures, many public insti-
tutions (including those involved in the pe-
troleum sector) have adopted managerial 
best practices which can usually be found 
in large and well-managed private corpora-
tions. 
According to the Law No. 22/2001, 
responsibility for three key functions of the 
governance of petroleum sector – i.e. poli-
cy, regulation and commercial (business) 
(Lubiantara) – which was previously held 
solely by Pertamina, is now separated into 
three distinct bodies. The policy function 
became the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources (Kemente-
rian ESDM), regulation function (including 
its monitoring and controlling) is the re-
sponsibility of BPMIGAS (now SKKMi-
gas), while the commercial aspects are the 
responsibility of Pertamina as a state-
owned company. 
For Pertamina, ever since the fall of 
Soeharto regime, the company has been put 
under intense public scrutiny due to its stra-
tegic and important position for the coun-
try‟s economy. The public demands that 
Pertamina be more transparent, clean and 
profitable. Further, as Pertamina now does 
not hold monopoly power and thus be-
comes an ordinary player in Indonesia‟s 
petroleum sector, the company is required 
to be able to directly confront its competi-
tors. These combined pressures have 
pushed the company to transform its busi-
ness process by adopting good corporate 
governance which usually can be found in 
well-managed private entities. 
In its stated strategic direction, Per-
tamina‟s business process transformations 
were focused on building a new corporate 
culture which includes: instilling anti-
corruption and costumer focussed mind-set 
among the employees, changing the com-
pany‟s values from a bureaucratic and mo-
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nopolistic company to a more competitive 
and entrepreneurship-oriented company, 
ensuring effective leadership within the 
company and creating a good public image 
to support the company‟s operations as 
well as to gain the government and public 
recognition for trustworthiness. Showing its 
seriousness, in 2006 Pertamina established 
a separate unit called the Management Cen-
ter Program whose tasks are to manage and 
ensure that these transformation programs 
run smoothly within the company 
(Pertamina, 2006).  
On the other side, the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources (Kemente-
rian ESDM) has implemented a series of 
bureaucratic reforms which touches the 
areas of, among others, accountability, hu-
man resources and organization (KESDM). 
To improve its accountability, the ministry 
compiles and publishes its financial reports 
regularly. Although a yearly financial re-
port is usual in private sector, in the Indo-
nesian public sector this is indeed a signifi-
cant achievement. Further, in the area of 
accountability the ministry also regularly 
publishes its performance report (LAKIP). 
LAKIP is an accountability report from 
public officials of a public organization to 
their stakeholders which reports the use of 
resources available to that organization. For 
a developing country which has gone 
through a violent transition from decades of 
autocratic regime to a democracy, these 
practices are indeed significant steps to-
wards a more thorough implementation of 
sound management principles in public sec-
tor organizations. 
Compared to Pertamina and Ke-
menterian ESDM, BPMIGAS is rather 
slow in adopting managerial best practices 
from private sector organizations. This 
condition might be related to the status of 
BPMIGAS as a newly established institu-
tion. As a new government agency which 
was established in 2002 following the end 
of Pertamina‟s monopoly, one of the prob-
lems faced by BPMIGAS was that the 
regulations necessary to support its opera-
tions were slow to materialise. One exam-
ple was the difficulty faced by BPMIGAS 
in compiling its yearly financial report. Un-
til 2008, BPMIGAS has been unable to 
compose its balance sheet because the Min-
istry of Finance had not decided the initial 
equity of this new agency (BPMIGAS, 
2011). Further, regarding the financial re-
ports of BPMIGAS, the chairman of Indo-
nesia‟s supreme audit body (BPK) com-
mented that the management control for the 
cost recovery (which is one of the main 
points in BPMIGAS‟ financial reports) was 
not transparent enough, and BPK therefore 
gave an adverse opinion or disclaimer on 
BPMIGAS‟s financial reports (BPK, 2009). 
Evolution of the relationship be-
tween the rates of growth of GDP and TFP 
in petroleum sector shows a different path 
when the period 1991-2010 is divided into 
the three sub-periods as seen in Table 3. 
During 1991-1997, GDP growth had a neg-
ative (and weak) relationship with the 
growth of petroleum TFP. This negative 
relationship implies the possibility that the 
exit strategy which was implemented dur-
ing the Soeharto era, might have succeeded 
in pulling the economy away from its de-
pendency on the petroleum sector. In other 
words, it is possible that from 1991 to 1997 
economic growth had „decoupled‟ from the 
growth of petroleum industry, since fluctu-
ations in the productivity of the petroleum 
sector had a negative relationship with the 
fluctuations in the country‟s economic 
growth.  
 
Table 3: Correlations 
Year 
Coefficient of correlation 
between the growth rates of 
GDP and petroleoum TFP 
1991-1997 -0,08 
1998-2003 0,53 
2004-2010 0,60 
Source: author‟s calculations 
 
After the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/1998, for the period 1998-2003, GDP 
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growth became positively correlated with 
the growth of petroleum TFP albeit at a 
moderate level. Hence, this positive rela-
tionship implies the possibility that post-
crisis Indonesian economy has „recoupled‟ 
with the petroleum industry – fluctuations 
in petroleum productivity growth could 
now be directly associated with fluctuations 
in the country‟s economic growth. The pe-
riod of 2004-2010 shows the same pattern 
as the period of 1998-2003. GDP growth 
continues to have positive correlation with 
the growth of petroleum TFP. 
As post-crisis economic growth be-
came positively correlated with petroleum 
TFP while at the same time oil output con-
tinued to decline, it might be only natural to 
ask: how dependent is the economy on the 
petroleum industry? To answer this ques-
tion it might be necessary to highlight the 
comparisons between the role of the petro-
leum sector in the economy during the oil 
boom era and during the post-crisis period. 
At the height of the oil boom era 
between the mid-1970s and the early 
1980s, the average share of petroleum rev-
enue in total government revenues was 
around 60% (Widiyanto), whereas in the 
post-crisis era of 2000-2010, on average it 
only reached 28% (Bank Indonesia). 
Hence, government revenue in post-crisis 
years may be less prone to be affected by 
fluctuations in petroleum prices than during 
the oil boom years. It appeared that, unlike 
the oil boom years, the non-petroleum sec-
tors now contribute the majority of gov-
ernment income. 
During 1970-1983, the petroleum 
sector‟s contribution to total exports was on 
average around 60% (Warr, 1992), whereas 
during 2000-2010 its share only reached 
around 21% (Bank Indonesia). Hence, it 
seems that aside from the low potential im-
pact of oil price fluctuations on government 
revenue, the main source of foreign ex-
change earnings may no longer rest on the 
exports of petroleum. During the oil boom 
era, oil exports significantly improved the 
country‟s current account in the balance of 
payments. Foreign exchange revenues pro-
vided by booming oil exports during this 
time period successfully removed the acute 
balance of payments constraint which for 
decades had limited the ability of the gov-
ernment to implement its economic devel-
opment programs (Arndt; Booth). It is 
possible that with the now diversified 
sources of foreign exchange earnings, the 
post-crisis economy in general might not 
have serious problem on the revenue side.  
There is the possibility that the is-
sue in the post-1997/1998 crisis period, 
however, lies on the expenditure side. The 
combination of declining domestic oil pro-
duction and increasing domestic demand 
for oil products put a lot of pressure on the 
country‟s balance of payments since oil 
must be imported to plug the gap between 
domestic oil supply and demand. After In-
donesia became a net oil importer, in the 
period of 2004-2010 an annual average of 
35% of the country‟s total reserves of for-
eign exchange has to be spent on oil im-
ports alone (Bank Indonesia).  
Another difference between the oil 
boom era and the post-crisis era may lie in 
the area of energy subsidies. During the 
early 1970s, the government even reported 
income surpluses as the price of oil prod-
ucts in the domestic market was higher than 
their production cost. However, rapidly 
growing consumption eventually outpaced 
production cost and by the end of 1970s 
and the early 1980s, subsidies for oil prod-
ucts began to show negative signs – which 
meant deficits in annual government budg-
et. During this period, the magnitude of the 
fuel subsidy stood at around 8% of total 
expenditure budget (Dick). In post-crisis 
years, particularly after 2004, subsidies for 
oil products swelled to around 17% of total 
annual government expenditure (Bank In-
donesia). In line with this, recent fuel sub-
sidy reforms are a good start to ease the 
burden of subsidy and provide more fiscal 
space for the government (World Bank). 
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Thus, it appears that the recoupling 
of the economic growth with the productiv-
ity growth of petroleum sector in the post-
crisis era occurred when the importance of 
petroleum sector in the economy was less 
than during the oil boom years. The econ-
omy no longer depends as much on the pe-
troleum sector as a source of revenue and 
foreign exchange earnings. It is possible 
that the one crucial role of the petroleum 
industry in this recoupling process may lie 
in the ability of the industry to limit the im-
pact of any external shocks that might ad-
versely affect the economy due to the rising 
fuel subsidy. Even amidst steadily declin-
ing output, revenue from petroleum sector 
consistently remain above total expendi-
tures on fuel subsidy. For example, be-
tween 2001-2010, fuel subsidy averaged 
only about 47% of total revenue from the 
petroleum sector (Bank Indonesia).  
Although Indonesia‟s petroleum 
TFP experienced significant growth be-
tween 2004-2010, steadily declining petro-
leum output, the fact that there are still un-
explored basins and the absence of the ap-
plication of advanced extraction technology 
might indicate that there remains room for 
further improvement in the productivity of 
the petroleum sector. Combined with the 
finding in this study that economic growth 
after the Asian financial crisis of 
1997/1998 is positively correlated with the 
petroleum productivity growth, long-term 
policy or strategy to provide the path for 
continuous productivity enhancement in the 
petroleum sector might be relevant for the 
future of Indonesia‟s economic growth.  
One of the challenges in Indonesia‟s 
petroleum development is the rising senti-
ment of resource nationalism. There are 
several measures that could be taken by 
both international oil companies (IOCs) 
and the host government to deal with re-
source nationalism (Maniruzzaman). First, 
a progressive taxation or profit-sharing me-
thod inherent in the initial exploitation 
agreement may be able to save the time and 
trouble for the parties involved in the event 
of high oil prices, which usually serves as a 
trigger for the resurgence of resource na-
tionalism. Second, equity participation in 
petroleum exploitation by the host govern-
ment may be diplomatically and strategical-
ly necessary to serve as a shield against the 
wave of resource nationalism, because fail-
ing to protect the government‟s investment 
would typically mean inviting unnecessary 
domestic political scrutiny. Third, corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) programs 
may be able to serve as a buffer for IOCs 
and the government against nationalistic 
demands, especially from the local popula-
tion where the petroleum resources lie. 
Fourth, transparency of corporate activities 
could be improved in order to minimise the 
lack of trust on the operational conducts of 
IOCs. Fifth, an early detection and preven-
tion mechanism for disputes could be im-
plemented so that immediate and appropri-
ate solutions can be quickly devised when-
ever there are early signs of friction among 
parties. Sixth, it might be better for IOCs to 
include international financial institutions 
(such as the Wold Bank or Asian Devel-
opment Bank) in their investment efforts, 
either as guarantor, lender or investor in 
order to bring more leverage in dealing 
with the rising sentiment of resource natio-
nalism. Losing important development aid 
from these international financial institu-
tions may invoke domestic political pres-
sures for the host government. Hence the 
presence of these institutions might deter 
any hostile action against IOCs that are op-
erating in a foreign country. 
Even though there are several ways 
in which to minimise the risks associated 
with resource nationalism, it might have to 
be admitted that this sentiment is prevalent 
in Indonesia and might not be able to be 
completely eliminated. Therefore, even 
though keeping Indonesia‟s petroleum sec-
tor open to fair competition should be the 
prime policy, it might be better if the fact 
regarding resource nationalism is also taken 
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into account in designing the strategy or 
policy to develop the productivity of Indo-
nesia‟s petroleum sector.  
Hence, perhaps the reasonable stra-
tegic policy would be to encourage Perta-
mina to be the driver for the development 
of the petroleum sector while still keeping 
the sector open for competition. It might be 
important to also note that proposing poli-
cies for the development of the petroleum 
sector often involves trade-offs between 
short-term and long-term objectives.  
Since the social and political condi-
tions in Indonesia dictate that it might be 
very hard and also unwise to exclude Per-
tamina from the development process of 
the country‟s hydrocarbon resources, it 
might be necessary for the government – as 
the sole owner of Pertamina – to provide 
greater financial freedom to Pertamina to 
be able to develop its own choice of tech-
nological core competencies. Reflecting on 
the success story of Statoil (Norwegian 
NOC) in building its unique technological 
competence, this policy requires govern-
ment support in shaping the innovative 
mentality and long-term outlook of the 
NOC. To achieve these objectives, in the 
case of Statoil, the Norwegian government 
granted the company full discretion over its 
cash flow with ready access to capital and 
with minimum budget constraints. Of 
course, just as in any other frontier tech-
nological development, there are cost over-
runs and project delays, but repercussions 
for failures were nonexistent, especially for 
the technical personnel. Hence, these ar-
rangements create ideal conditions for 
technological risk-taking and the result is 
Statoil‟s core technological competencies 
in deepwater exploitation, operations in 
harsh environment, integration of complex 
value chains for natural gas projects and in 
producing as well as refining heavy oil 
(Thurber & Istad)
4
.  
                                                          
4
 In contrast, an Indonesian energy analyst stated that 
only 10% of Pertamina‟s profit is reinvested back to 
the company by the government, whereas as a com-
One of the challenges of this policy 
is that it may adversely affect the govern-
ment‟s ability to collect rent from its petro-
leum resources, at least in short-term. 
Hence, significant reduction in tax reve-
nues and dividends with all of its political 
consequences might have to be endured by 
the ruling government. Another challenge 
may lie in the euphoria of anti-corruption in 
Indonesia, which has occurred ever since 
the end of the Soeharto era and often re-
sults in „witch hunt‟ type of prosecutions. 
Therefore, the chance of criminalisation for 
failures in government-funded technologi-
cal development projects is rather high in 
Indonesia, especially in the capital-
intensive petroleum industry. One of the 
ways to circumvent this condition is by is-
suing government regulation, hence reduc-
ing legal uncertainty, that places a certain 
maximum cap (for example at a certain 
percentage of Pertamina‟s retained earn-
ings) for research and development fund 
that is available for technological develop-
ment and investment purposes which Per-
tamina could use without having to be lia-
ble for negative results in their field appli-
cations. 
Moreover, it might be appropriate 
for the government to consider devising 
local content policy for the petroleum sec-
tor through the imposition of tariff barriers. 
This may serve as second best option amid 
the strong sentiment of resource national-
ism in Indonesia. Carefully designed local 
content policy may create backward lin-
kages as well as forward linkages and thus 
would spur the process of technology spill-
over along the value chain of the petroleum 
sector. The argument that a local content 
policy may create distortions and ineffi-
ciencies may hold true. However, carefully 
designed policy with good transparency, 
reliability and predictability might be able 
to minimise these adverse effects. Local 
                                                                                     
parison, the Malaysian government reinvested 70% 
of Petronas‟ profit back to the company (Dhany, 
2013). 
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content policy may induce inefficiency if 
the policy is introduced without carefully 
considering the degree of “technological 
strangeness” in the economy (Tordo). Pri-
mitive or very limited economies could not 
be expected to quickly be able to supply 
industrial intermediate goods or services. 
Hence, the policy should be designed in 
gradual stages that closely follows the 
ability of the rest of the economy to devel-
op supporting industries and services for 
the petroleum sector. For example, when 
the U.K. needed to boost its stalling econ-
omy in 1970s, the country decided to speed 
up the development of its North Sea hydro-
carbon fields and attracted American ser-
vice companies and expertise without giv-
ing enough time for its domestic industries 
to learn and develop their skills. In contrast, 
Norway developed its petroleum sector 
more slowly, allowing its domestic service 
sector to catch up, gain expertise and de-
velop. The result is that Norway‟s supply 
industry now has a strong expertise and 
competence in managing logistical services 
in complex petroleum projects (Thurber & 
Istad; Hallwood, 1990, as cited in Tordo, 
2011).  
The local content policy objectives 
may be better achieved through the imposi-
tion of tariffs rather than non-tariff barriers. 
Tariff barrier is more transparent and may 
provide less distortions in the market than 
non-tariff barrier (Anderson; Moschini). 
Although non-tariff barriers could be em-
ployed to correct market failures, however, 
they could also be used to distort free trade. 
Hence, it could be difficult to distinguish 
„legitimate‟ from protectionist motivations 
for non-tariff barriers policy (WTO). 
Further, it might be necessary for 
the tariff rates to closely follow the best 
practices in the East Asian region in order 
to avoid over-protection of the domestic 
industries that could lead to inefficiencies 
in the overall value chain of the petroleum 
sector. Different import tariffs could be 
employed with higher rates imposed for 
products or services which could be sup-
plied by domestic firms, whereas lower 
rates could be imposed for products or ser-
vices which cannot be acquired from do-
mestic sources. This policy has been im-
plemented for decades in the Indonesian 
automotive industry and the petroleum sec-
tor could take the lessons from the long pe-
riod of implementation of this policy in the 
automotive industry. 
Lastly, it might be important for the 
government to consider giving fiscal incen-
tives as an instrument to encourage tech-
nological progress in the petroleum sector. 
Drawing lessons from the successful devel-
opment of fracking technology which was 
spurred by fiscal incentive in the form of 
tax credit for unconventional gas explora-
tion and exploitation (Graves), this pattern 
could also be applied in some Indonesian 
basins which, due to their characteristics, 
present a high level of technological chal-
lenges. A report by the Indonesian ministry 
of energy and mineral resources stated that 
there are 22 basins in Indonesia that have 
not been explored and most of them are 
located in deepwater areas in the eastern 
regions of the country (KESDM). These 
regions are infamous for their lack of infra-
structure facilities. Therefore, fiscal incen-
tives could be devised with the aim to de-
velop the exploitation of hydrocarbon re-
serves in these areas. These incentives 
could also focus on spurring the develop-
ment of more advanced and complicated 
extraction technologies, such as hydraulic 
fracturing, for the exploitations of petro-
leum resources in other regions of Indone-
sia. 
 
Conclusion 
Analysis on the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and petroleum sector‟s TFP 
revealed the possibility that after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997/1998, the Indone-
sian economy recoupled with the petroleum 
sector. Before the crisis, the country‟s GDP 
growth rates used to have a negative corre-
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lation with the growth rates of petroleum 
TFP. However, the correlation between 
them became positive in the post-crisis era. 
 One of the challenges in Indonesia‟s 
petroleum development is the rising senti-
ment of resource nationalism. Even though 
keeping Indonesia‟s petroleum sector open 
to fair competition should be the prime pol-
icy, it might be more appropriate if the fact 
regarding resource nationalism is also taken 
into account in designing the strategy or 
policy to develop the productivity of Indo-
nesia‟s petroleum sector.  
 
References 
Alisjahbana, A. (2009), "Revisiting Indo-
nesia‟s sources of economic growth 
and its projection towards 2030," 
Working Papers in Economics and 
Development Studies, 200905, De-
partment of Economics - Padjadja-
ran University, Bandung, Indonesia. 
Anderson, J. E. (1988), "The relative inef-
ficiency of quotas," he Journal of 
Economic Education, 19(1), 65-81.  
Anwar, D. F. (2004), "Review of the book 
Suharto: a political biography, by 
R.E. Elson. Journal of Islamic Stu-
dies, 15(3), 396-399.  
Arndt, H. W. (1983), "Oil and the Indone-
sian economy," Southeast Asian Af-
fairs, 10, 136.  
Aswicahyono, H., and H. Hill (2002), 
'Perspiration' vs 'inspiration' in 
Asian industrialisation: Indonesia 
before the crisis," Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, 38(3), 138-163. 
doi: 
10.1080/00220380412331322381 
Azwar, A. S. (2012, November 16), Energy 
Minister to hold a meeting with key 
oil and gas contractors, The Jakarta 
Post. Retrieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/new
s/2012/11/16/energy-minister-hold-
a-meeting-with-key-oil-and-gas-
contractors.html 
Badan Pusat Statistik (2011), Sistem Nera-
ca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia Tahun 
1975-2008, Jakarta: BPS. 
Baier, S. L., G.P. Dwyer and R. Tamura 
(2006), "How important are capital 
and total factor productivity for 
economic growth?" Economic In-
quiry, 44(1), 23-49. doi: 
10.1093/ei/cbj003 
Bank Indonesia (2014, January 30, 2014), 
Statistik Ekonomi dan Keuangan 
Indonesia (SEKI), Retrieved 30 
January, 2014, from 
http://www.bi.go.id/id/statistik/seki/
terkini/keuangan-
pemerintah/Contents/Default.aspx 
Barnes, P. (1995), Indonesia, the Political 
Economy of Energy, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Basri, M. C. and H. Hill (2011), "Indone-
sian growth dynamics," Asian Eco-
nomic Policy Review, 6(1), 90-107. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1748-
3131.2011.01184.x 
Bennett, M. S. (1995), "Banking deregula-
tion in Indonesia," University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Interna-
tional Business Law, 16, 443-481.  
Bennett, M. S. (1999), "Banking deregula-
tion in Indonesia: an updated pers-
pective in light of the Asian finan-
cial crisis," University of Pennsyl-
vania Journal of International 
Business Law, 20, 1-59.  
Booth, A. E. (1992), The Oil Boom and Af-
ter: Indonesian Economic Policy 
and Performance in the Soeharto 
Era, Singapore: Oxford University 
Press. 
Boyd, M., A. Devero, J. Frias, J. Meyer, 
and G. Ross (2010), "A note on pol-
icies for the oil and gas sector," Bul-
Back to oil: Indonesia economic growth … (Iswahyudi) 41 
letin of Indonesian Economic Stu-
dies, 46(2), 237-248. doi: 
10.1080/00074918.2010.486111 
BPK (2009, August 21), BPK Nilai Cost 
Recovery BP Migas Tidak Wajar, 
Retrieved 22 January, 2015, from 
http://www.bpk.go.id/news/bpk-
nilai-cost-recovery-bp-migas-tidak-
wajar 
BPMIGAS (2011), Annual Report 2011, 
Jakarta: BPMIGAS. 
Bremmer, I. and R. Johnston (2009), "The 
rise and fall of resource national-
ism," Survival, 51(2), 149-158. doi: 
10.1080/00396330902860884 
Bridgman, B., V. Gomes and A. Teixeira 
(2011), "Threatening to increase 
productivity: evidence from Brazil‟s 
oil industry," World Development, 
39(8), 1372-1385. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worldde
v.2011.01.001 
Butt, S. and F. E. Siregar (2013), "State 
control over natural resources in In-
donesia: implications of the oil and 
natural gas law case of 2012," Jour-
nal of Energy & Natural Resources 
Law, 31(2).  
Chen, P. C. and M. M. Yu (2014), "Total 
factor productivity growth and di-
rections of technical change bias: 
evidence from 99 OECD and Non-
OECD countries," Annals of Opera-
tions Research, 214(1), 143-165. 
doi: 10.1007/s10479-012-1087-4 
Cornwell, K. and T. Anas (2013), "Survey 
of recent developments," Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 
49(1), 7-33. doi: 
10.1080/00074918.2013.772937 
Crafts, N. F. (1996), "Endogenous growth: 
lessons for and from economic his-
tory," CEPR Discussion Papers. 
Dhany, R. R. (2013, March 4), Petronas 
Setor ke Malaysia Rp 190 Triliun, 
Pertamina ke RI Cuma Rp 7 Triliun, 
News, Retrieved from 
http://finance.detik.com/read/2013/
03/04/163432/2185238/4/2/petronas
-setor-ke-malaysia-rp-190-triliun-
pertamina-ke-ri-cuma-rp-7-triliun 
Dick, H. (1980), "The oil price subsidy, 
deforestation and equity," Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, 
16(3), 32-60.  
Djiwandono, J. S. (2000), "Bank Indonesia 
and the recent crisis," Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 
36(1), 47-72. doi: 
10.1080/00074910012331337783 
Dowling, J. M. and C. F. Yap (2008), In-
donesian economic development: 
mirage or miracle?" Journal of 
Asian Economics, 19(5), 474-485. 
doi: 10.1016/j.asieco.2008.09.012 
Graves, J. (2012), Fracking - America's 
Alternative Energy Revolution, 
Ventura, CA: Safe Harbor Interna-
tional. 
Grosskopf, S. and S. Self (2006), "Factor 
accumulation or TFP? a reassess-
ment of growth in Southeast Asia," 
Pacific Economic Review, 11(1), 
39-58. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
0106.2006.00298.x 
Habir, A. D. (2013), "Resource nationalism 
and constitutional jihad," Southeast 
Asian Affairs, 2013(1), 121-134.  
Hill, H. (2000), "Indonesia: the strange and 
sudden death of a tiger economy," 
Oxford Development Studies, 28(2), 
117-139. doi: 10.1080/713688310 
Ikhsan, M. (2007), "Total factor productivi-
ty growth in Indonesian manufac-
turing: a stochastic frontier ap-
proach," Global Economic Review, 
36(4), 321-342. doi: 
10.1080/12265080701694488 
42 ECONOMIC JOURNAL OF EMERGING MARKETS, 8(1) April 2016, 25-44  
Indonesian Government (1974), Keputusan 
Presiden RI Nomor 11 Tahun 1974 
Tentang Rencana Pembangunan 
Lima Tahun Kedua, Jakarta: The 
Government Publisher. 
Kaminsky, G. L. and C. M. Reinhart, "The 
twin crises: the causes of banking 
and balance-of-payments prob-
lems," The American Economic Re-
view, 89(3), 473-500. doi: 
10.2307/117029 
Karim, M. (2013), "A controversial deci-
sion of the constitutional court on 
the Indonesian oil and gas law," The 
Journal of World Energy Law & 
Business, 6(3), 260-263. doi: 
10.1093/jwelb/jwt006 
KESDM (2011), Peluang Investasi Sektor 
ESDM, Jakarta: KESDM. 
KESDM (2014), Reformasi Birokrasi, Re-
trieved February 3, 2014, from 
http://www.esdm.go.id/ 
Krugman, P. (1994), "The myth of Asia's 
miracle," Foreign Affairs, 73(6), 62-
78. doi: 10.2307/20046929 
Lau, L. J. and J. Park (2003), The sources 
of East Asian economic growth re-
visited, Paper presented at the Con-
ference on International and Devel-
opment Economics in Honor Henry 
Y. Wan, Jr., Cornell University, 
Ithaca. 
Levine, R. and S. J. Zervos (1993), "What 
we have learned about policy and 
growth from cross-country regres-
sions?" The American Economic 
Review, 83(2), 426-430. doi: 
10.2307/2117702 
Lubiantara, B. (2012), Ekonomi Migas - 
Tinjauan Aspek Komersial Kontrak 
Migas, Jakarta: PT Gramedia Wi-
diasarana Indonesia. 
Maniruzzaman, A. (2009), The issue of re-
source nationalism: risk engineering 
and dispute management in the oil 
and gas industry," Texas Journal of 
Oil, Gas, and Energy Law, 5(1), 79-
108.  
Margono, H. and S. C. Sharma (2006), Ef-
ficiency and productivity analyses 
of Indonesian manufacturing indus-
tries," Journal of Asian Economics, 
17(6), 979-995. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.20
06.09.004 
Moschini, G. (1991), "Economic issues in 
tariffication: an overview," Agricul-
tural Economics, 5(2), 101-120. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0169-
5150(91)90001-2 
OECD/IEA (2008), Energy Policy Review 
of Indonesia, Paris: International 
Energy Agency. 
OGJ. (1999, July 26), Indonesia Considers 
Legislation that Would End Perta-
mina's 30 Year Petroleum Monopo-
ly, Retrieved from 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/v
olume-97/issue-30/in-this-
issue/general-interest/indonesia-
considers-legislation-that-would-
end-pertaminas-30-year-petroleum-
monopoly.html 
Osada, H. (1994), "Trade liberalization and 
FDI incentives in Indonesia: the 
impact on industrial productivity," 
The Developing Economies, 32(4), 
479-491. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-
1049.1994.tb01051.x 
Pallone, S. (2009), "Indonesia‟s oil crisis: 
how Indonesia became a net oil im-
porter," Journal of International 
Policy Solutions, 10(3), 1-10.  
Pertamina (2006), Laporan Tahunan Per-
tamina - Pertamina Annual Report, 
Jakarta: Pertamina. 
Pertamina. (2013), Laporan Tahunan Per-
tamina - Pertamina Annual Report, 
Jakarta: Pertamina. 
Back to oil: Indonesia economic growth … (Iswahyudi) 43 
Prawiro, R. (1998), Pergulatan Indonesia 
Membangun Ekonomi: Pragma-
tisme dalam Aksi, Jakarta: Elex 
Media Komputindo. 
Quah, D. (1993), "Galton's fallacy and tests 
of the convergence hypothesis," The 
Scandinavian Journal of Econom-
ics, 95(4), 427-443. doi: 
10.2307/3440905 
Soesastro, H. (2007), The rise of resource 
nationalism in Indonesia, opinion, 
Retrieved from 
www.thejakartapost.com website: 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/new
s/2007/09/13/rise-resource-
nationalism-indonesia.html 
Solow, R. M. (1956), "A contribution to the 
theory of economic growth," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
70(1), 65-94. doi: 10.2307/1884513 
Solow, R. M. (1957), "Technical change 
and the aggregate production func-
tion," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 39(3), 312-320. doi: 
10.2307/1926047 
Suyanto and R. A. Salim (2010), "Sources 
of productivity gains from FDI in 
Indonesia: is it efficiency improve-
ment or technological progress?" 
The Developing Economies, 48(4), 
450-472. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-
1049.2010.00115.x 
Taylor, R. J. (2007), Technical progress 
and economic growth: an empirical 
case study of Malaysia, Chelten-
ham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
The Economist (2012), Oil and Mining in 
Indonesia - Foreigners Beware. 
Business, Retrieved from 
www.economist.com website: 
http://www.economist.com/news/bu
siness/21567117-foreign-investors-
are-getting-nervous-foreigners-
beware 
The Titi Tudorancea Bulletin, (2014, Janu-
ary 30, 2014), Indonesia: Crude Oil 
Proved Reserves, Retrieved 30 Jan-
uary, 2014, from 
https://www.tititudorancea.com/z/ie
s_indonesia_crude_oil_proved_rese
rves.htm 
Thee, K. W. (2003), "The Indonesian eco-
nomic crisis and the long road to re-
covery," Australian Economic His-
tory Review, 43(2), 183-196. doi: 
10.1111/1467-8446.t01-1-00050 
Thurber, M. C. and B.T. Istad (2010), 
"Norway‟s evolving champion: sta-
toil and the politics of state enter-
prise," Program on Energy and Sus-
tainable Development Working Pa-
per, (92). Stanford University, Stan-
ford, CA. 
Tivey, J., M. Habriansyah and F. Abrar 
(2003), "Overview of the new Indo-
nesian oil and gas law," Australian 
Resources and Energy Law Journal, 
22, 443-449.  
Tordo, S (2011), National oil companies 
and value creation, World Bank 
Publications. 
Usui, N. (1997), "Dutch disease and policy 
adjustments to the oil boom: a com-
parative study of Indonesia and 
Mexico," Resources Policy, 23(4), 
151-162. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0301-
4207(97)00023-8 
Van der Eng, P. (2010), "The sources of 
long-term economic growth in In-
donesia, 1880–2008," Explorations 
in Economic History, 47(3), 294-
309. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2009
.08.004 
Vivoda, V. (2009), "Resource nationalism, 
bargaining and international oil 
companies: challenges and change 
in the new millennium," New Polit-
44 ECONOMIC JOURNAL OF EMERGING MARKETS, 8(1) April 2016, 25-44  
ical Economy, 14(4), 517-534. doi: 
10.1080/13563460903287322 
Wardany, I. (2012, November 14), All 
Contracts with BP Migas Still Va-
lid, President The Jakarta Post, Re-
trieved from 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/new
s/2012/11/14/all-contracts-with-bp-
migas-still-valid-president.html 
Warr, P. G. (1992), Exchange rate policy, 
petroleum prices, and balance of 
payments, in A. Booth (Ed.), The 
oil boom and after - Indonesian 
economic policy and performance 
in the Soeharto era, Singapore: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Widiyanto, I. (2004), Essays on Growth, 
Productivity and the Oil Industry in 
Indonesia. (Ph.D Thesis), Dalhousie 
University - Canada, Ann Arbor.  
World Bank (2000), Indonesia - Oil and 
Gas Sector Study, Washington, DC: 
The World Bank. 
World Bank, (2014, January 30, 2014), 
World Development Indicators, 
2014, Retrieved 30 January, 2014, 
from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
WTO (2012), World Trade Report 2012 - 
Trade and Public Policies: A Closer 
Look at Non-tariff Measures in the 
21st Century, Geneva: World Trade 
Organization. 
Young, A. (1994), "Lessons from the East 
Asian NICS: A contrarian view," 
European Economic Review, 38(3–
4), 964-973. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-
2921(94)90132-5 
 
 
 
 
 
